Is the Stock Option Effective to Maintain Key Management? Evidence from Indonesia Listed Companies by Feliana, Yie Ke & Lianggono, Fransisca
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, management compensations are not only 
in terms of salary but also in another term that 
makes managements have a longer focus on corpo-
rate performance. One popular type of compensation 
is a stock option. This type of compensation is ar-
gued would increase management sense of belong-
ing to the company. The stock option is granted to 
maintain highly qualified key managers in a long 
time. Maintaining high qualified key manager is im-
portant due to the high-cost burden to the company. 
Recruitment and training costs for new employees 
are estimated at 150-175% higher than average an 
employee's annual salary (Hansen, 1997). Further-
more, termination costs and loss of productivity re-
duction are, on average, 50-200% of an annual em-
ployee salary. It can be higher for the turnover costs 
of valuable employees (Oyer & Schaefer, 2004). 
Some previous studies have examined the effec-
tiveness of the stock option to keep employees. Al-
damatz et al. (2018) provided evidence that granting 
broad-based employee stock options decreases em-
ployee turnover in US companies. Balsam et al.  
(2007) showed that voluntary employee turnover 
during the vesting period is lower than the post-
vesting period; thus, it can be said that the stock op-
tion postpones the employee to resign voluntarily. 
In Indonesia, research of the role stock option is 
dominated by the effect of the stock option to the 
company performance (Asyik, 2010; Kameswari & 
Astikaa, 2014; Kresnawati et al., 2016). There were 
only limited studies that examined the effect of the 
stock option to employee turnover in Indonesia. One 
of these studies was done by a team from Indonesia 
Securities Exchange Commission (i.e., Bapepam at 
that time) in 2002. The results of this study showed 
that employee stock options could reduce employee 
turnover. However, this study reports some limita-
tions, i.e., a low response rate of the questionnaire 
and only focused on employee stock options. This 
study report has not covered management stock op-
tions that are more valuable in retaining them in a 
long time. Therefore, this study examines whether 
the management stock options are effective in main-
taining the managers in Indonesia listed companies.  
This paper is organized as follows, discussion of 
relevant literature in order to support the hypothesis, 
research methods, results and discussion, and finally, 
the conclusion of this study. 
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ABSTRACT: Management stock option is a form of compensation which has a hypothetical function to 
maintain key management, that in the end, the goal is improving company performance. This study aims to 
prove the hypothesis using Indonesia listed companies' data over the 2012-2016 period. The turnover rate 
measures management retention. The effectiveness of management stock options is examined during the vest-
ing and exercised period, while management stock options are measured in three ways, i.e., a dummy of the 
existence of stock option, the amount of stock option, and the number of shares that are offered as stock op-
tions. Management stock options are found limited in Indonesia listed companies. Overall, the results showed 
that granting management stock options are only useful in retaining the management only during the vesting 
period. This study contributes to the remuneration and nomination committee in regulating the optimal man-
agement stock options.  
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1.1. Agency theory and compensation plan 
Based on Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
managers as agents and shareholders as principals 
should design contracts to motivate a rational agent to 
act on behalf of a principal when the agent’s interests 
would otherwise conflict with those of the principal 
(Scott, 2015). One of the contracts is an employment 
contract in terms of a compensation plan. An executive 
compensation plan is “an agency contract between the 
firm and its manager that attempts to align the interests 
of owners and manager by basing the manager’s com-
pensation on one or more measures of the manager’s 
performance in the operating firm” (Scoot, 2015). 
Many compensation plans are based on two per-
formance measures, i.e., net income and share price 
(Scott, 2015). Share options make the compensation 
plan based on the share price. More share-based 
compensation produces a longer decision horizon, as 
demonstrated by Bushman & Indjejikian (1993). 
Since share price will quickly reflect unrealized 
profit on long-term projects, managers can be en-
couraged to invest in risky projects. Employee stock 
option provides this incentive since if they succeed, 
they can become precious. Yet, if they do not suc-
ceed, the lowest the employee stock option can be 
worth is zero. Effendi et al. (2007) found that the 
larger the value of a CEO’s employee stock option 
holdings, the higher his/her incentive to misstate the 
financial statements in order to support the stock 
price. However, Rajgopal & Shevlin (2002) stated 
the effect of employee stock options to encourage 
risk-averse managers to undertake risky projects 
when the projects were economically desirable, not 
to encourage excessive risk-taking. 
1.2. Stock option 
A stock option is the option or right of key employ-
ees to purchase an ordinary share at a given price 
over an extended period of time (Kieso et al., 2018). 
The shareholders' general meeting should approve of 
the decision to give stock options. The stock option 
has two periods, i.e., vesting and execution periods. 
The vesting period is the period, which all the speci-
fied vesting conditions of a share-based payment 
award must be satisfied (IASB, 2018). This period is 
between the grant date and the vesting date. During 
the vesting period, the employees cannot exercise 
their options. The execution period is the time period 
when the employees can exercise their options. The 
execution period is concluded by one date when the 
options are expired. 
 
1.3. Stock option and turnover 
A Management stock option reduces management 
turn-over during the vesting period. Balsam et al. 
(2007) scrutinized that employee turnover is lower 
during the vesting period than an exercise period. 
They used Fortune 100 companies as samples. This 
result is supported by broad-based employee stock 
options (BBSO) in Aldamatz et al. (2018), where 
they showed that granting stock option reduces em-
ployee turnover by 2% per year in the three years af-
ter granting it, after that, employee turn-over increas-
es 87%. Therefore, a stock option is successfully 
postponing, not preventing employee turnover. In 
terms of management stock option, Jochem et al. 
(2017) provided evidence that share-based payment 
can effectively retain executives.  
Based on the results of these previous studies, the 
same relationship was predicted in Indonesia listed 
companies, as stated in the following hypothesis: 
H1: Management  stock options affect  management 
turnover. 
Specifically, this H1 was examined in 2 periods.  
H1a: During the vesting period, the management 
stock option reduces management turnover. 
H1b: During the exercise period, the management 
stock option increases management turnover. 
In order to consider the magnitude of management 
stock options, this study examined the effect of the 
amount of management stock option compensation 
expense and the number of shares that are offered as 
management stock options to the management turno-
ver. Both of them occurred in the vesting period. 
H2: Management stock option expenses affect man-
agement turnover 
H3: Number of shares that are offered as a manage-
ment stock option affects management turnover. 
In the exercise period, further analysis was done by 
examining the effect of the execution rate of man-
agement stock options on the management turnover. 
H4: Execution rate of management stock options af-
fect management turnover. 
2. RESEARCH METHODS 
The population of this research was Indonesia listed 
companies in 2012-2016 across the type of indus-
tries. There were some requirements to be the sample 
of this study where sample selection was reported in 
Table 1. Data were collected from companies’ annual 
reports that are available on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change web site or the companies’ web sites.  
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1. Reporting currency other than IDR
2. No data available
-370
-70
Beginning sample 1,941 
Regression Model (1)




Beginning sample 1,941 
Not in the vesting period -1,929
Final sample 12 
Regression Model (3)
Beginning sample 1,941 
Not in the execution period -1,863
Outliers -1
Final sample 78
Regression equation (1) to test H1a and H1b is as 
follows: 
 (1) 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 




(𝑇𝐾𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1) 2⁄
𝑥 100%
The measurement of  TURNOVERit  is adopted 
from Jochem, Ladika, and Sautner (2017).  OUTit is 
the number of key managements that are not on the 
list of the board that year. TKM is the number of 
total key managements. Key management should 
include the top management of the company. Due to 
Indonesia applied two- tiers board system, the key 
management in this research is people in the executive 
board and commissioner board, excluding independent 
commissioners. Independent commissioners do not 
include because, according to security exchange 
authority rules (Bappepam IX.1.6), the independent 
commissioner is prohibited from having direct or 
indirect ownership to the company; thus, they will not 
grant management stock options. 
The independent variable of VESTit is a dummy 
variable that is coded by 1 if the company is in the 
vesting period; otherwise, it is 0. The second 
independent variable EXECit is also a dummy 
variable that is coded by 1 if the company is in the 
exercise period; otherwise, it is 0. If a company in a 
year has some stock options that are some in the 
vesting periods and some in the exercise period, it 
will be counted as in exercised period for 
conservatism reasons.  
Control variables in the regression equation (1) 
are adopted from Aldamatz et al., (2018). SIZEit is 
measured by the log of total assets at the end of that 
year. PROFITit is profitability that is measured by 
the  ratio of earnings before tax to total assets. 
LEVit is the leverage that is measured by the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets. MCAPit is a log of 
market capitalization that is measured by closing 
stock price at the end of the year multiply by out-
standing share at the end of the year. Final-
ly, INDit is a dummy variable to identify the type in-
dustry of the company. i.e. 1 for agriculture, 2 for 
mining, 3 for basic industry and chemical, 4 for 
miscellaneous industry, 5 for consumer goods, 6 for 
property and real estate, 7 for infrastructure and util-
ities, 8 for finance, and 9 for trade and services. 
H2 and H3 are examined in the regression equa-
tion (2) as follows: 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑋P𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷  (2) 
The independent variable COMPEXPit is stock 
compensation expense that is measured by the log of 
management stock option compensation. This in-
formation is collected from the notes to the financial 
statements. The second independent variable of 
SHARESit is the log of number outstanding stock op-
tions. The other variables are the same as in the re-
gression (1). 
H4 is examined in the regression equation (3): 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸V𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  (3) 
The independent variable fo EXECURATEit is the 
ratio of shares that are executed to number outstand-
ing stock option. The other variables are the same 
as equation (1) and (2). 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive statistics for all variables in each regres-
sion model are shown in Table 2 and 3.  
Table 2. The Measurement Model 
Variable Mean Max Min 
Regression Model (1)-N = 1,741 
Turnover 7.10% 0% 36.36% 
Size (Mio IDR) 17,024,045 6,817 1,038,706,009 
PROFITit 4.31% -1096.53% 209.27% 
LEVjt 57.12% 0.02% 1683.44% 
MCAP (Mio 
IDR) 
11,799,108 1,661 445,498,235 
Regression Model (2)-N=12 
Turnover 8.20% 0% 63.16% 
COMPEXP (Mio 
IDR) 
21,976 2,827 54,932 
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agement until the external funding gives payback re-
turn to the companies 
Table 4. Description of Companies granted Management Stock 
Options 
VEST EXEC TOTAL 
Size 
Small 1 6 7 
Big 11 73 84 
Profit 
Low 5 39 44 
High 7 40 47 
Leverage 
Low 2 24 26 
High 10 55 65 
Market Cap 
Small 1 11 12 
Big 11 68 79 
Table 5 shows the regression result for model (1). 
Companies in the vesting period have lower man-
agement turnover compared to the others, but com-
panies in the execution period have higher manage-
ment turnover, thus H1a and H1b are accepted. 
This results are consistent to findings of Balsam et 
al. (2017); Jochem et al. (2017); Aldamatz et al. 
(2018). These results indicate that management 
stock options are effective in retaining key manage-
ment. However, they will resign from the companies 
after they exercise their stock options. 
Table 5 Regression result model (1) 
Coefficients p-value
Constants -14.838 0.000* 
VESTjt -7.814 0.007* 
EXECjt 2.814 0.010* 
SIZEjt 2.315 0.000* 
PROFITjt 0.010 0.088 
LEVjt 0.005 0.106 
MCAPjt -0.693 0.068 
INDjt 0.205 0.018* 
F-test 8.505 0.000* 
Adjusted R2 0.029 
During the vesting period, key management cannot 
exercise their options. If they resign during this peri-
od, they will lose their right to get stock options. In 
the period of execution, management has the right to 
exercise when option “in money”, otherwise when 
option “out money”. They can also exercise all or a 
part of their stock options. In the execution period, 
management has no bonding to the company any-
more, so they can resign at any time without losing 
their rights because the options have vested. The ex-
ecution rate of Indonesia listed companies during 
2012-2016 is relatively low (Figure  1). The low exe-
cution rate indicates two possibilities. First, the mar-
ket price of the stocks was not significantly higher 
comparing to exercise price. Therefore, the managers 
Cont. 
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Cont. 
98,132,733 1,000,000 240,953,500 
33,112,225 2,022,388 111,748,593 
5.91% 0.02% 12.20% 
SHARESjt 
Size (Mio IDR) 
Profit 
LEVjt 64.4% 8.22% 90.82% 
MCAP (Mio 8,546,111 603,007 25,113,235 
IDR) 
Regression model (3)-N=78 
12.89% 0% 50% 
31.48% 0% 100% 




Size (Mio IDR) 
Profit 







Companies that have management stock options 
in 2012-2016 were limited. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Nominal Variables 
Model (1) VESTit EXECit 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Panel A 
0 1,731 99.4% 1,667 95.7% 
1 10 0.6% 74 4.3% 
Total 1,741 100% 1,741 100% 






INDit (1) (2) (3) 
1 3 8 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 0 
5 0 2 
6 1 16 
7 1 2 










483 1 21 
Companies granted management stock options are 
bigger in terms of size and market capitalization. In 
Indonesia, large companies have a higher dependen-
cy on valuable key management. This phenomenon 
is different from the findings in developed countries 
where management stock option is more common in 
a small company. The reason is that a small compa-
ny has limited resources to give compensation to the 
management (Scott, 2015). Besides, higher market 
capitalization companies tend to provide more man-
agement stock options because this type of compen-
sation is more valuable to their managers. In terms 
of profitability, there is no significant difference be-
tween the low and high profitability companies in 
granting management stock options. Higher leverage 
companies have more compensation in management 
stock options; this can be to a longer view of man-
decided not to use their rights. Second, they were 
waiting until they think the market price is higher 
enough because there are some periods of time until 
the stock options are expired. 
The coefficient of VEST is 2.78 times larger than 
the coefficient of EXEC. The effect of management 
stock options during the vesting period to retain key 
Management is higher than the number of key man-
agements that resign during the execution period. It 
provides a suggestion for nomination and remunera-
tion committee in order to manage time period of 
vesting so it will be optimal for the company. The 
vesting period is not too short, so the company will  
get  enough  benefits  in  retaining key management 
long enough, but also it should not too long, be-
cause it makes the management stock options are not 
valuable any more for them, then they just ignore 















Figure 1 Execution rate of management stock options 
 
The results of the regression model (2) for H2 and 
H3, in Table 6, cannot be concluded. There is a 
multicollinearity problem, and the model does not 
pass the goodness of fit test as reported in adjusted 
R2 and F-test. The cause is not enough samples. 
Only 12 firm-years that are in the vesting periods 
during 2012- 2016. 
Table 6 Regression model results (2) 
 Coefficients p-value 
Constants 0.926 0.997 
COMPEXPjt 4.024 0.753 
SHARESjt -37.329 0.318 
SIZEjt 122.126 0.239 
PROFITjt 1.989 0.654 
LEVjt -0.076 0.923 
MCAPjt -103.910 0.312 
INDjt -4.629 0.432 
F-test 0.779 0.638 
Adjusted R2 -0.164 
H4 also cannot be concluded by the result of the regres-
sion model (3) in Table 7. The sample shows normality 
and heteroscedasticity problems, so the results are bi-
ased and not consistent. In addition, the F-test for the 
model (3) failed. The possible reason is not enough 
sample for this model, only 78 firm-years report 
in the period of execution during 2012-2016. 
Table 7 Regression model results (3) 
 Coefficients p-value 
Constants -7.008 0.854 
EXECURATEj,t -0.015 0.761 
SIZEjt 6.064 0.145 
PROFITjt 0.284 0.382 
LEVjt 0.064 0.484 
MCAPjt -5.507 0.233 
INDjt 0.873 0.199 
F-test 1.288 0.274 
Adjusted R2 0.022 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study finds that management turnover de-
creases during the vesting period and increases dur-
ing the execution period. The decrease in turnover is 
higher than the increase in turnover. It can be con-
cluded that management stock options are effective 
in retaining key management, but only to postpone 
them to resign, not prevent them. The major limita-
tions of this study are limited companies in Indone-
sia that were granted management stock options as 
one type of compensation to the key management. 
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